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I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more firms transact online in an attempt to cut
procurement costs, operate more efficiently, and reduce transac-
tion costs, business-to-business ("B2B") electronic commerce sites
have abounded. Tagging along with the increased interest of busi-
nesses conducting transactions online is the attentive and watchful
eye of antitrust regulators. For example, the Big Three auto manu-
facturers (General Motors, Ford, and Daimler Chrysler) want to
plan a venture creating a B2B marketplace where they can transact
in raw materials, components, and parts.' The Federal Trade
2Commission is currently reviewing the venture. Similarly, six of
the nation's largest meat agribusinesses (IBP Inc., Cargill, Inc.,
Smithfield Foods, Tyson Foods, Gold Kist, and Farmland Indus-
tries) are planning to launch a B2B cooperative site.3 Senator Paul
Wellstone, D-Minn., and other Minnesota legislators have asked the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division to investigate the coopera-
tive.4
This article begins by tracking the explosive growth of elec-
tronic commerce. Second, it provides a thorough description of
the B2B marketplace. 5 Third, in order to understand the frame-
work of antitrust, this article provides a brief history of the relevant
antitrust laws as applied in the traditional bricks and mortar mar-
6ketplace. Fourth, a discussion applying the most relevant tradi-
tional antitrust laws to the B2B marketplace identifies several ques-
tions. Specifically, it questions the definition of the Internet's
1. Charles Bogino, Commercial Law-Electronic Commerce: Business-to-BusinessE-
Markets Imperiled by Possible Antitrust Action, NAM Claims, 68 U.S.L.WK. 2632, 2633
(Apr. 25, 2000).
2. Id.
3. Andrea Foster, B2Bs Raise Antitrust Concerns FTC Probes and Advises Ex-
changes; Lawyers in Demand, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 2000, at BI.
4. Id. (quoting Wellstone, "[w]hile this new alliance purports to enhance
efficiencies, I am concerned about the market implications of our nation's largest
meat agribusinesses sharing market information and resources").
5. Infra Part II.B.1-6.
6. Infra Part III.A-E.
1734 [Vol. 27:3
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/5
2001] ANTITRUST CONCERNS IN THE B2B MARKETPLACE
relevant market,7 the formation of biased partnerships,8 the avail-
ability of pricing information on the Information Superhighway,9S . 10
and the identification of competitive relationships. Lastly, a re-
view of the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Com-
petitors identifies some key issues to consider when forming a B2B
marketplace, as well as a safety zone for joint ventures."
II. THE INTERNET REVOLUTION
The online marketplace, commonly known as electronic
commerce, 2 is growing and developing at an astronomical pace.
For example, radio took thirty-eight years to reach fifty million
Americans, network television took thirteen years to reach fifty mil-
lion and cable television took ten years to reach fifty million.' 3 By
comparison, it took only three years after the first web browser be-
came widely available for the Internet to reach approximately fifty
million domestic users. 1 In 1998 alone, the number of Internet
domain names increased by forty-five percent and consumers spent
roughly $11 billion online. In 1999, consumers spent $15 billion16
online. Consumers can now perform virtually any transaction
online from purchasing airline tickets, to buying and selling stocks,
to getting the top news story of the day. Currently, there are an es-
timated 171 million people using the Internet.1
7
A. Types Of Electronic Commerce Transactions
There are several ways investors can make money using the
types of transactions on the Internet. 8 Most investors' attention is
7. Infra Part IV.A, B.
8. Infra Part IV.C.
9. Infta Part IV.D.
10. Infra Part IV.E.
11. Infra Part V.
12. H.R. 4429, 106th Cong. (2000) (defining electronic commerce as
"[c]ommercial transactions on the Internet, whether retail business-to-customer or
business-to-business").
13. Robert Pitofsky, Electronic Commerce and Beyond: Challenges of the New Digital
Age, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/rpwilson2.htm (Feb. 10, 2000).
14. Id.
15. David Balto, Antitrust and the Emerging World of Electronic Commerce, 10
ELECrRONiC BANKING L. & COM. REP. 9 (Apr. 1999).
16. Pitofsky, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. ARTHUR B. SCULLEY & W. WILLiAM A. WOODS, B2B EXCHANGES, THE KILLER
APPLICATION IN THE BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS INTERNET REVOLUTION 3 (1999) [herein-
1735
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focused on companies or businesses that sell to consumers. 9 This
economic transaction is known as the "business-to-consumer"
("B2C") transaction. 20 A consumer buying a book from Ama-
zon.com, Inc.21 is an example of a B2C transaction.22
Consumers can also transact with other consumers ("C2C").
23
Online auctions, such as eBay, Inc., where individuals can pur-
chase items from other individuals, is an example of a C2C transac-
24
non.
Consumer-to-business ("C2B") transactions, though relatively
new, occur where the consumer states a price for a product.
26
Priceline.com, where consumers can indicate a price they are will-
ing to pay for such things as airline tickets, is an example of a C2B
27
transaction.
The B2B is the last type of transaction that occurs on the
Internet.28 The B2B transaction occurs when businesses transact
with other businesses over the Internet.2
B. Growth Of The B2B Marketplace
Before the emergence of the B2B marketplace, a complex ap-
plication called enterprise resource planning ("ERP") was cre-
ated.3 0 ERP, used by large companies, manages inventory and inte-
grates business processes across divisional and organizational




21. Amazon.com, at http://www.amazon.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2000).
22. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 3.
23. eBay.com, at http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
24. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 3.
25. Id.
26. Priceline.com, at http://www.priceline.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
27. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 3-4.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. Some examples of B2B exchanges are: Catastrophe Risk Exchange
(www.catex.com), Chemdex Corporation (www.chemdex.com), Credit Trade
(www.creditrade.com), e-Chemicals, Inc. (www.e-chemicals.com), Elinex, Inc.
(www.el-in-ex.com), e-Steel (www.e-steel.com), MetalSite (www.metalsite.net), The
National Transportation Exchange (www.nte.net), PaperExchange (www.paperex-
change.com), PlasticsNet (www.plasticsnet.com), TechEx (www.techex.com). Id.
at 196-246.
30. Susan S. DeSanti, The Evolution of Electronic B2B Marketplaces, at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/b2bdesanti.htm (last visited June 29, 2000).
31. Glossary, at http://www.netmarketmakers.com/glossary/index.asp. (last
visited July 20, 2000).
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32
products necessary to meet production schedules.
Companies then hardwired themselves together with other
companies and acted as buyers and suppliers for each other.3 This
process is known as electronic data interchange ("EDI") .s Because
EDI costs thousands of dollars to implement and acts within a
closed system, businesses have looked for a more efficient way to
35conduct electronic commerce.
Thus, the B2B marketplace emerges as open for business from
anywhere in the world, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. In
1998, B2B marketplaces generated $43 billion, and an estimate for
362003 is that B2B marketplaces will generate $1.3 trillion. By com-
parison, B2C will generate only $108 billion by 2003.3, That is ex-
plosive growth!
1. Defining The B2B Marketplace
The most basic definition of the B2B marketplace is "online
transactions between one business, institution, or government
agency and another. 38  The B2B marketplace is about allowing
"multiple buyers and sellers to carry out sales and procurement ac-
tivities over the Internet."39
2. Benefits Of The B2B Marketplace
By bringing together large numbers of buyers and sellers, the
B2B marketplace allows businesses to automate transactions, make
32. DeSanti, supra note 30.
33. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 18-19.
34. Glossary, supra note 31 (defining EDI as an "[o ] lder version of electronic
commerce between buyers and suppliers; more cumbersome and costly than Net-
based commerce, feasible only for large companies and their most significant trad-
ing partners").
35. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 18-19 (stating that the "reliability,
speed, and security of the Internet" as well as the "acceptance of standards like ex-
tensible markup language (XML)" allows companies to exchange information on
the Internet using a PC with a web browser and an Internet connection).
36. Id. at 18; see also H.R. 4429, 106"' Cong. (2000) (stating that business-to-
business transactions are "[o]ne of the fastest growing sectors of electronic com-
merce" and that by 2003, "business-to-business transactions will amount to more
than ten times the amount of the 131 billion dollars estimated to have been
reached in 1999").
37. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 18.
38. Glossary, supra note 31.
39. DeSanti, supra note 30 (describing the B2B marketplace as the process of
.searching for, identifying, negotiating with, ordering and receiving from, and
then paying an input supplier" while online).
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choices available to buyers, give sellers access to new buyers, and
40
reduce transaction costs. In addition to businesses that reap re-
wards from buying and selling in the B2B marketplace, market
makers can "earn vast revenues" by "extracting fees for transactions
occurring within the B2B marketplaces."4 ' Finally, "because the
marketplaces are made from software-not bricks and mortar-they
can scale with minimal additional investment, promising even more
attractive margins as the markets grow."42 All in all, it is estimated
that B2B electronic commerce accounts for approximately seventy
43percent of the regular economy. Thus the efficiency implications
of B2B marketplaces are vast.
3. How Businesses Conduct Business In B2B Marketplaces
In order to understand B2B marketplaces, it is important toS44
know how they conduct business online. Businesses make pur-
45chases in two broad categories.
The first category, called "manufacturing inputs," consists of
"the raw materials and components that go directly into a product
or a process. ''46 Because these goods produce a finished product,
manufacturers usually purchase them from industry specific sup-
pliers known as vertical markets.4 7
The second category, called "operating inputs," is generally
not industry specific. 48 These goods, typically used by all businesses,
are purchased from horizontal markets.
40. Steven Kaplan & Mohanbir Sawhney, E-Hubs: The New B2B Marketplaces,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 2000, at 97-8.
41. Id. A net market maker is defined as a company, who does not necessarily
own the goods, that creates an Internet market matching buyers and sellers. Glos-
sary, supra note 31.
42. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98.
43. DeSanti, supra note 30 (citing Eric Schonfeld, Corporations of the World,
Unite., E-CoMPANY, June 2000, at 125).
44. Id.
45. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98.
46. Id.
47. Id. A vertical market is defined as a market that "tend[s] to serve
particular industries and provide product expertise and in-depth content
knowledge for that industry." DeSanti, supra note 30.
48. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98. Another name for operating in-
puts is maintenance, repair, and operating ("MRO"). Glossary, supra note 31 (de-
fining MRO as "routine purchases such as office supplies, travel services, or com-
puters needed to run a business but not central to the business's output").
49. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98. Two examples of vendors serving
all types of industries are Staples and American Express. Id. Horizontal markets
are markets that sell "materials or services that any company needs, not those used
1738 [Vol. 27:3
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Once it is understood what businesses purchase, it is necessary
to determine how they purchase products and services. Basically,
goods are bought through either systematic sourcing or spot sourc-
ing.50 Buyers purchase through systematic sourcing when they have
"negotiated [long term] contracts with qualified suppliers."5' By
contrast, spot sourcing does not likely involve a long-term relation-
ship between the buyer and seller." In spot sourcing, a buyer can
purchase an immediately necessary product at the lowest possible
price.
4. Classification Of B2B Marketplaces
After determining how businesses purchase goods and what
goods they purchase, B2B marketplaces can be classified into four
main markets: MRO hubs, yield managers, exchanges, and catalog
hubs.53
MRO hubs use a systematic sourcing buying technique for op-
erating inputs.54 Thus, they tend to develop long-term contracts
across several different industries (horizontal markets) . MRO
hubs tend to provide value by distributing goods with low value and
56high transaction costs.
Yield managers use a spot sourcing buying technique for oper-
ating inputs.57 Accordingly, they provide short notice purchasing
across several different industries (also horizontal markets) .8 Yield
managers provide value by distributing goods and services that have
significant "price and demand volatility.",
9
for manufacturing or production." Glossary, supra note 31. Some companies serv-
ing the horizontal market in the B2B marketplace are Ariba Network, Commer-
ceOne's MarketSite.net, and EmployEase. Id.
50. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98.
51. Id. (describing that buyers and sellers have a close relationship).
52. Id. A spot market is a "market for unplanned purchases not made under
contract terms" and occurs on a "one-time basis." Glossary, supra note 31.
53. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98.
54. Id. at 98-99 (listing Ariba, W.W. Grainger, MRO.com, BizBuyer.com,
CommerceOne, PurchasingCenter.com, and ProcureNet as MRO hubs).
55. Id. at 98.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 99 (listing Employease, Adauction.com, CapacityWeb.com, Youtili-
ties, eLance, and iMark.com as yield managers). An auction, "where buyers bid
competitively for products from individual suppliers" is an example of a yield
manager. Glossary, supa note 31. Auctions work well for hard-to-move goods and
in situations of excessive inventory. Id.
58. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 98-99.
59. Id. at 99.
1739
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Exchanges use a spot sourcing buying technique for manufac-
turing inputs. 0 They provide short notice exchanges of "commodi-
ties or near-commodities [necessary] for production" in a specific
industry (vertical markets).61 Exchanges provide value by maintain-
ing a relationship with buyers and suppliers, but without the com-
mitment of a negotiated contract.
62
Lastly, catalog hubs use a systematic sourcing buying technique
for manufacturing inputs.63 They provide purchasing and selling
through long term contracts for goods used in specific industries
(vertical markets).64 Like MRO's, catalog hubs create value by re-
ducing5 transaction costs and by providing a large number of sup-
pliers.
5. The Market-Making Mechanism For B2B Marketplaces
There are two different mechanisms used in B2B market-
places: aggregation and matching.66 Each mechanism works best
under specific applications. 67
Aggregation provides one-stop shopping for companies. It
provides value by streamlining the transactions between businesses
by "aggregating the product catalogs of many suppliers in one
place and in one format."6 This mechanism is quite stable becauseS 69
prices are pre-negotiated. Buyers will benefit when more sellers
are added and sellers will benefit when more buyers are added.7°
Thus, aggregation is useful when: (1) transaction costs are high
60. Id. (listing e-Steel, PaperExchange.com, Altra Energy, and IMX Exchange
as exchanges). An exchange is a "[t]wo sided marketplace ... where buyers and
suppliers negotiate prices, usually with a bid and ask system, and where prices
move both up and down." Glossary, supra note 31.
61. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 99.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 98-100 (listing Chemdex, SciQuest.com, and PlasticNet.com as cata-
log hubs).
64. Id. at 99-100.
65. Id. Catalog hubs "[i]ake sense of buying options by aggregating catalogs
from multiple vendors with relatively static prices" and assist buyers in understand-
ing the multiple vendors. Glossary, supra note 31. They "function as virtual dis-
tributors but don't take possession of goods themselves." Id.
66. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 100.
67. B2B EXCHANGES, supra note 18, at 34 (listing e-chemicals, Chemdex, Met-
alSite, and PlasticsNet as examples).
68. Id.
69. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 100 (stating "the aggregation
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compared to the cost of the item; (2) the "[p] roducts are special-
ized, not commodities"; (3) there are a large number of specialized
products; (4) the suppliers are fragmented;71 (5) buyers do not un-
derstand "dynamic pricing mechanisms"; (6) "[p]urchasing is done
through7 pre-negotiated contracts"; and (7) metacatalogs can be
created.
By contrast, matching "brings buyers and sellers together to
negotiate prices on a dynamic and real-time basis. ",7 Matching can
occur on an auction and is required in spot sourcing because
"prices are determined at the moment of purchase. "74 Both buyers
and sellers benefit when either a buyer or a seller is added.75
Therefore, matching is useful when: (1) commodities "can be
traded sight unseen"; (2) trading costs are huge; (3) buyers and
sellers understand "dynamic pricing"; (4) "[c]ompanies use spot
purchasing to smooth the peaks and valleys of supply and de-
mand"; (5) third parties perform shipping; and (6) "[d] emand and
prices are volatile."
6. Biases Of B2B Marketplaces
The last important characteristic of a B2B marketplace is its
bias. A B2B marketplace is either biased or neutral.77
Neutral B2B marketplaces are "operated by independent third
parties" and favor neither buyers nor sellers. However, biased
B2B marketplaces operate without a third party intermediary.79 Ba-
sically, a partnership is formed and the B2B marketplace will then
entertain either sellers or buyers. s°
71. Fragmentation is a "[m]arket condition when there is no dominant group
of buyers or suppliers, but where many buyers are chasing many suppliers, often
inefficiently." Glossary, supra note 31.
72. Kaplan & Sawhney, supra note 40, at 100.
73. Id. at 100- 02.





79. Glossary, supra note 31.
80. Id. (stating that buy-side coalitions provide a lot of transactions, creating
liquidity). An example of a bias for buyers is an auction, where there are several
sellers, but only one buyer.
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAWS
Before there can be an antitrust analysis of the virtual B2B
marketplace, there must be an understanding of how the antitrust
laws have been applied to the brick and mortar marketplace.
Because the nation's economy underwent significant changes
in industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century,
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890." Congress followed up
by passing the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.82
The Sherman Act states in section 1 that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, is ... declared to be illegal.""' Section 2 states that
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
,,84
The Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the commission
to declare unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affect-
ing commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
,,85fecting commerce ....
A. Monopolize
The concept of monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act is violated when a defendant: (1) possesses monopoly
power; (2) in a relevant market; and (3) willfully acquires and
86maintains that power.
The possession of a monopoly power requires the "power to
81. Saul P. Morgenstern & Eamon O'Kelly, Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech-
nology Industries: Keeping Cyberspace Safe For Innovators or Just Another Speed Trap On
the Information Superhighway?, 547 PLI/PAT, 1009, 1016 (1999).
82. Id.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 1 provides for very steep
penalties for a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. If convicted, corporations may be
fined up to $10 million, individuals may be fined up to $350 thousand, and both
may face imprisonment of up to three years. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
86. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (holding that
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control prices or exclude competition" in a relevant market. 7
Generally, a company's market share indicates whether a monopoly
power exists. s8 However, market share alone may not be dispositive
of a company's monopoly power because the company still must
89demonstrate the power to control prices or exclude competition.
The power to monopolize must occur within the relevant
product market and relevant geographic market.90 The relevant
product market includes "commodities reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purposes."9' A product does not have to
be fungible in order to be considered part of a relevant product
912market. The relevant geographic market is the "section of the
country" in which firms compete with one another.93
Lastly, monopolization requires "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. ,9  The courts generally use such
words as, "exclusionary," "anticomspetitive," and "predatory" to de-
scribe the acts of monopolization.
An example of a predatory act occurs when a company harms
consumers or competition "by making a short-term sacrifice in or-
87. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)
(appraising the illegal power to monopolize according to the terms of the com-
petitive market for the product). "When a product is controlled by one interest,
without substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power." Id. at 394.
88. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 429 (2nd Cir. 1945) (stating that a market share of ninety percent
gave it a monopoly). The court in Aluminum Co. stated that "it is doubtful whether
sixty or sixty-four percent" of the market share constitutes a monopoly and "cer-
tainly thirty-three percent is not." Id. at 424.
89. L.A. Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1993) (ar-
guing that a sole existing bowling center with 100 percent of the market share is
not a monopoly because it did not demonstrate the power to control prices or ex-
clude competition).
90. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 394-95 (holding that the relevant
market for cellophane includes other flexible packaging materials).
91. Id. at 395. An example of products competing in the same relevant mar-
ket occurs when a decrease in the price of cellophane causes a significant number
of other flexible packaging customers to switch to cellophane. Id. at 400.
92. Id. at 394.
93. Brown Shoe Co., v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-28 (1962) (stating
that the geographic market was nationwide when shoe manufacturers merged and
distributed their shoes nationwide).
94. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
95. Id. at 576 (stating that restrictive agreements, pricing practices, and
acquisition of competitors were part of an unlawful and exclusionary practice); see
also Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 147
(4th Cir. 1990) (identifying "predatory conduct").
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der to facilitate its exclusive, anti-competitive objectives." 96 Exclu-
sion occurred in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
when Aspen Skiing Company could not justify, by normal business
purposes, its conduct of refusing to continue offering ski passes to
Aspen Highlands customers, even though it would have been
beneficial to Aspen Skiing Company.97
B. Attempt To Monopolize
A violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act's "attempt to mo-
nopolize" requires the plaintiff to "prove (1) that the defendant has
engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power.
9 8
Proof of anticompetitive conduct may be used to infer "specific
intent to monopolize." 99 The intent necessary is "a specific intent
to destroy competition or build [a] monopoly ...... 100 Lastly, a dan-
gerous probability of achieving monopoly power requires a defini-
tion of the "relevant market" and an "examination of market
power."' 0' Generally, courts tend to reject claims of "dangerous
probability" when a company's market share is below fifty per-
102cent.
C. Contracts, Combinations And Conspiracies
There is a basic distinction between section 1 and section 2 of
the Sherman Act. A violation of section 1 requires an unreasonable
restraint of trade caused by a "contract, combination, or conspir-
96. Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc., 910 F.2d at 148 (arguing that the durable
medical equipment provided for by the defendant was inferior in quality and more
expensive than their competitor's with adverse effects on the consumers and the
competition).
97. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-10
(1985) (sacrificing "short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a
perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival").
98. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
99. Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc., v. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d 904, 915 (2nd
Cir. 1988).
100. Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953)
(stating that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing").
101. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 455.
102. U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (lth Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Wichita Clinic, P.A., v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1164,1193 (D. Kan. 1999).
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acy" between separate entities.03  A violation of section 2 occurs.. • ,,104
when a single firm "threatens actual monopolization. Thus, a
section 1 violation occurs "when 'the conspirators had a unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of
minds in an unlawful arrangement." 0 5  Generally, restraint of
trade is assessed through either a rule of reason analysis or a per se
analysis. 1 6 However, the rule of reason is the standard most often
used. 107
The "rule of reason" analysis, whether there is a restraint of
trade, considers "a variety of factors, including specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and ef-
fect."08 Thus, the rule of reason inquires only upon the "restraint's
impact on competitive conditions."'
There also exists a hybrid analysis of the rule of reason, coined
the "quick-look" analysis."' Nevertheless, the inquiry of "whether
or not the challenged restraint enhances competition" remains the
same in both analyses."'
103. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(stating that concerted action involving horizontal price fixing and market alloca-
tion are "inherently anticompetitive" and illegal per se). The Court in Copperweld
Corp. stated that concerted activity should be approached more aggressively be-
cause concerted activity divests the marketplace of its own individual decision-
making. Id. at 768-69. Thus, multiple entities act to combine for a "common
benefit," which decreases diversity in the marketplace. Id.
104. Id. at 767.
105. Id. at 771 (stating that a corporation cannot conspire with its own subsidi-
ary).
106. A.B.A. SECT. OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1999 REV. ANTrrRUSTL. Div. 34 (2000).
107. Id.
108. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The Court in Khan ex-
plained that a supplier of gasoline may set a maximum price that a gas station op-
erator can charge to its customers as long as the price fixing does not amount to
"anticompetive conduct." Id. at 22.
109. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-91 (1978)
(holding that the rule of reason only considers whether the agreement is procom-
petitive or anticompetitive). The Court in National Society of Professional Engineers
clearly demonstrated the rule of reason when it rejected the Society's claim that
competitive bidding for engineers may pose a threat to the public safety. Id. at
695. Safety and other ethical conduct is not a sufficient reason to abort competi-
tive activity. Id. at 696.
110. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (stating that the
"quick-look analysis carries the day when the great likelihood of anticompetitive
effects can easily be ascertained").
111. Id. at 780 (reversing the court of appeals' quick-look analysis that a dental
association violates restraint of trade when it prevents dentists from certain types
of advertising because of lack of anticompetitive scrutiny).
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Certain types of agreements are deemed unreasonable re-
straints of trade per se when the "challenged action falls into the
category of 'agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry .... Examples of per se violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act include "horizontal price-fixing, mar-




Vertical price-fixing arrangements between firms in an attempt
to set a minimum price are illegal per se.' 4  However, vertical
maximum price setting follows the rule of reason analysis and is not
illegal per se. 15116
Horizontal price-fixing is considered to be unlawful per se.
Fixing prices by competitors is illegal per se when it is either used
to eliminate competition of other competitors or used as an in-
112. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing, 472
U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
113. A.B.A. SEcT. OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 106, at 37.
114. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911).
Vertical agreements setting a minimum price between firms has been illegal per se
as stated by the Supreme Court:
The contracting wholesalers or jobbers covenant that they will sell to no
one who does not come with complainant's license to buy, and that they
will not sell below a minimum price dictated by complainant. Next, all
competition between retailers is destroyed, for each such retailer can ob-
tain his supply only by signing one of the uniform contracts prepared for
retailers, whereby he covenants not to sell to anyone who proposes to sell
again unless the buyer is authorized in writing by the complainant, and
not to sell at less than a standard price named in the agreement. Thus,
all room for competition between retailers, who supply the public, is
made impossible. If these contracts leave any room at any point of the
line for the usual play of competition between the dealers in the product
marketed by complainant, it is not discoverable. Thus a combination be-
tween the manufacturer, the wholesalers, and the retailers, to maintain
prices and stifle competition, has been brought about.
Id. at 399-400 (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 42 (6th
Cir. 1907)).
115. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding that vertical maxi-
mum price setting is subject to the rule of reason analysis).
116. Big Bear Lodging Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that competitors in the sales of ski packages and lodging ac-
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strument of a conspiracy among competitors to reduce competition
among themselves.
"Price-fixing includes more than the mere establishment of
uniform prices." 18  The Supreme Court has stated that the "ex-
change of price data and other information among competitors
does not invariably have anti-competitive effects."1  Therefore,
when assessing the exchange of price data between competitors,
the correct tool is the rule of reason analysis and not the per se
rule.120 This is so because in some cases the exchange of price data
"increases economic efficiency and renders markets more, rather
than less competitive."12'
E. Refusals To Deal
"A 'refusal to deal' may raise antitrust concerns when the re-
fusal is directed against competition and the purpose is to create,
maintain, or enlarge a monopoly." 122 In the absence of an intent to
monopolize, a refusal to deal is generally lawful.
121
The establishment of a predatory intent is quite necessary in
upholding a refusal to deal.124 However, another approach in re-
117. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 784
(7th Cir. 1999). "Competitors are permitted by the antitrust laws (and certainly by
the per se rule) to engage in cooperative behavior, under trade association aus-
pices or otherwise, provided they don't reduce competition among themselves."
Id.
118. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940).
119. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). How-
ever, the Supreme Court asserted that competitors exchanging current pricing in-
formation, though not a per se violation, has been consistently held as a violation
of the Sherman Act. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. See also United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923); Am. Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921).
122. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that Intel's refusal to deal with Intergraph was without merit since Inter-
graph provided no support, indicating Intel's competitive position was enhanced).
123. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483
n.32 (1992) (stating that a monopolist may rebut evidence of refusals to deal by
establishing a valid business justification for its conduct); United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (stating that "[iun the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] [A]ct does not restrict the long
recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal").
124. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1951) (de-
scribing that an intent to monopolize the dissemination of news and advertising
1747
15
Doda: Antitrust Concerns in the B2B Marketplace: Are They "Bricks and M
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
fusal-to-deal cases is to invoke the "essential facilities" doctrine. 25
Crucial to the successful application of the "essential facilities" doc-
trine is the presence of a competitive relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant."'
In MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,'27 the court found
liability under the "essential facilities" doctrine because the follow-
ing elements were present: "(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facil-
ity to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facil-
ity.,,128
IV. POTENTIAL ANTITRUST CONCERNS FOR THE B2B MARKETPLACE
There is no question markets are changing at Internet speed.
With the rapid technological development and the accompanying
market changes, the B2B marketplace has become the subject of
market abuse. Accordingly, B2B marketplaces potentially may raise
the same traditional antitrust questions that are raised by the tradi-
tional bricks and mortar marketplaces.
129
A. Monopolize
Recall that the concept to monopolize under section 2 of the
Sherman Act consists of the possession of monopoly power in a
relevant market willfully acquired and maintained. 0 B2B market-
occurred when the only newspaper in town refused to sell advertising to persons
who also advertised on a competing radio station).
125. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 400 (1912) (holding
that an association of railroads controlling railroad terminals, bridges, and switch-
ing yards was created for the anticompetitive purpose of limiting competitors' ac-
cess to the crucial facilities).
126. See Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080,
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that an antitrust claim occurs when a competing
plaintiff is denied access by a monopolist to an essential facility); Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating "the essen-
tial facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential
facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the
second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first"). The court in Alaska
Airlines, Inc. stated that the anti-competitive action by the monopolist must be in-
tended to "eliminate competition in the downstream market." Alaska Airlines, Inc.
948 F.2d at 545.
127. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1132-33.
129. DeSanti, supra note 30.
130. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
1748 [Vol. 27:3
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/5
2001] ANTITRUST CONCERNS IN THE B2B MARKETPLACE
places must be able to live within this rule.
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Atlantic Pacific International, Inc.,'31
the court stated that Sea-Land's market share of thirty-three per-131
cent was not sufficient to support a monopoly power. More in-
terestingly, the court also stated that Sea-Land's and Matson's mar-
ket shares could not be lumped together without a showing of
concerted action.133 This holding infers that for a B2B marketplace
to possess a monopoly, the multiple buyers and/or sellers must act
in a concerted manner.134
America Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net3 5 recently addressed the
concept of the relevant market. In that case, the court rejected the
defendant's description of e-mail advertising as a relevant product
market because GreatDeals.Net did not present evidence of an in-
terchangeable substitute. IM The court described a number of in-
terchangeable substitutes for e-mail advertising, including "World
Wide Web, direct mail, billboards, television, newspapers, radio,
and leaflets.'
3 1
Interestingly, the court also defined the relevant geographic
market of the Internet.38 The Internet cannot be defined by its
outer boundaries because "[i]t is not a place or location; it is infi-
nite.",39 In AOL's case, the geographic market could not be limited
to just their subscribers because there are "'literally tens of millions
of people with access to the Internet [and] there are other means
of advertising" to people on the Internet and AOL subscribers.'
Thus, a B2B marketplace only provides one place to supply or
buy a product or service. Therefore, any conceptualization to mo-
nopolize by a B2B marketplace would be difficult due to the cur-
rent definition of the geographic market of the Internet. Obvi-
ously, a competitor would still have other more traditional means
to supply or buy products and services.
131. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (D. Haw. 1999).
132. Id. at 1113; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
133. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1113-14.
134. Id.
135. 49 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 1999).
136. Id. at 858. See also supra notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text.
137. Am. Online, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456,
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B. Attempt To Monopolize
As stated in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,14' any attempt to
monopolize requires the plaintiff to show "anticompetitive conduct
with a specific intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power.'
The most often used criterion in determining whether there is
a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power is a com-
pany's ability to stifle competition in a relevant market.14 As seen
in America Online, Inc., the geographic market of the Internet is
without boundaries and is infinite. 4That court held there was no
probability that AOL could achieve a monopoly because the Inter-
net is infinite. A court is unable to measure the market share of
companies conducting business on the Internet simply because that
market is without definition.
46
Thus, because the B2B marketplace conducts business through
the Internet,147 the B2B marketplace has no defined relevant mar-
ket. Unless and until a court determines the geographic bounda-
ries of the Internet, B2B marketplaces cannot be found inviolate of
an attempt to monopolize.
C. Contracts, Combinations And Conspiracies
As stated earlier in Part III.C., any restraint of trade by a con-
141. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
142. Id. at 456.
143. Id.
144. Am. Online, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
145. Id. at 861; see also Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 486-87
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that there is no unlawful attempt to monopolize the
"Blue Car" corporate contract service market when there is no indication that mo-
nopolization of that relevant market is even possible).
146. Am. Online, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (stating that "[t]he Internet is not
regulated and an entrant's ability to participate in the market and offer services
like that offered by AOL is without boundary"). The lack of regulation upon the
Internet has been recognized:
No single entity-academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit-
administers the Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact
that hundreds of thousands of separate operators of computers and
computer networks independently decided to use common data transfer
protocol to exchange communications and information with other com-
puters (which in turn exchange communications and information with
still other computers).
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(quoting Am. Civil Liberties v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
147. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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tract, combination, or conspiracy between two entities is illegal.
Generally, the rule of reason analysis will determine whether there
is a restraint of trade.1
48
In determining a violation of restraint of trade by contract,
combination, or conspiracy in a B2B marketplace setting, some de-
termination of its bias is inevitable. For example, a neutral B2B
marketplace is unlikely to be in violation since it is operated by an
independent third party and favors neither buyers nor sellers.
However, a biased B2B marketplace may present a question of
whether the forming of a partnership, for the purpose of entertain-
ing either suppliers or buyers, amounts to a conspiracy. The dis-
trict court in Modesto Irrigation District v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
149
reiterated the Supreme Court's holding that "[a] § 1 agreement
may be found when the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an
unlawful agreement."50
Thus, in this context, the formation of a biased B2B market-
place should be advanced with some trepidation.
D. Pricing Arrangements
Generally, price-fixing agreements are per se illegal.15' How-
ever, when pricing occurs as merely an exchange of information,
certain economic efficiencies and procompetitive behavior may re-
suilt.152 In this case, where there is no direct evidence of price-
fixing, the rule of reason analysis applies.
15
In the context of B2B marketplaces, the exchange of pricing
information occurs almost instantaneously, assuming firms wish to
provide their most current and accurate price. This raises the con-
cern of "conscious parallelism" where two or more competitors in a
market act separately but in parallel fashion in their pricing deci-
sions.' 54 Conscious parallelism is probative evidence of competitor
price-fixing. 55 Certain "plus factors" must exist in an analysis of
148. Supra Part III.C. and accompanying notes.
149. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
150. Id. at 1065 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984)).
151. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
152. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); In re
Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1999).
153. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441 n.16.
154. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d at 121-22.
155. Id. at 122.
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conscious parallelism, including action contrary to economic inter-
est and motivation to enter a price-fixing arrangement.156
The court in In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation used the rule of
reason to affirm the lower court's decision, holding that the ex-
change of price information, by word of mouth, between sales rep-
resentatives of the three largest manufacturers of baby food, does
not rise to a conspiracy to price-fix."' The court reasoned the se-
lected information was current, public and available for all to see."'
Using this analysis, pricing information placed on the Internet
by B2B marketplaces likely would fall short of price-fixing because
the Internet is public and available for all to see and use. Unless
there is collusion between competitors (discussed below in section
V under the heading of Joint Ventures), price-fixing within a B2B
marketplace under the exchange of information theory likely re-
quires direct evidence.
59
E. Refusal To Deal
Recall a refusal to deal is an antitrust violation when the re-
fusal, directed against competition, is intended to create, maintain,
or enlarge a monopoly. 
16
In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,161 Intergraph sued Intel's cus-
tomers, alleging infringement of its patents. Intel then withdrew
its technical assistance and other special benefits it previously pro-
vided Intergraph. 163 The lower court issued an injunction, requir-
ing Intel to continue to deal with Intergraph.' 64 However, the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed, holding that there was no violation of section
2 because Intel's action injured a customer, not a competitor.1
65
156. Id.
157. Id. at 121-27 (stating that defendant's communications with competitors
were not related to the setting of price, the information the defendant communi-
cated was all current or public, and defendant did not act on any information ob-
tained through the communications).
158. Id. at 126.
159. Id. at 118-21.
160. See discussion supra Part III.E.
161. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 1350.
163. Id. The court recognized that the bringing of a lawsuit by a customer is a
legitimate business reason for a manufacturer to terminate their business rela-
tions. Id. at 1358.
164. Id. at 1350-51.
165. Id. at 1358-59.
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The requisite intent was also lacking in America Online, Inc.'66
GreatDeals.Net alleged that America Online threatened to cut off
AOL subscribers from other Internet providers if they continued to
deal with GreatDeals.Net.167 The court stated GreatDeals.Net failed
to plead facts sufficient to infer intent to monopolize or attempt to
monopohize.'6
Thus, the cases cited above indicate the current trend contin-
ues to require a competitive relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant. When the structure of a B2B marketplace resem-
bles suppliers and buyers using a matching mechanism for spot
sourcing, such as an exchange or yield manager, a competitive rela-
tionship is usually lacking. Consider the relationship. It is symbi-
otic. A supplier requires a means to distribute its product, and a
buyer requires a means to acquire a product. In addition, since
prices are negotiated on a real time basis in an exchange or yield
manager, the addition of new buyers or sellers is beneficial because
the lowest prices can be attained. Accordingly, the intent necessary
for a refusal to deal allegation is unlikely found in such a symbiotic
relationship.
The refusal to allow a competitor access to an essential facil-
ity'69 also implicates a refusal to deal. 7 ' In Intergraph Corp., the
court rejected Intergraph's claim that Intel's chip samples and
technical information were essential facilities. 71 The court based
its decision on the absence of a competitive relationship and a rele-
vant market. 17
2
In America Online, Inc., the court granted AOL's motion to
dismiss because the defendants failed to plead the second, third,
and fourth elements of the essential facilities test.173 "Elements two,
three, and four require that the monopolist and the plaintiff are
competitors." 74 Specifically, the defendants failed to allege AOL
was a competitor in the unsolicited bulk mail market and that the
166. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 862 (E.D. Va.
1999).
167. Id. at 860-61.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 862 (stating "'[a]n 'essential facility' is one which is not merely help-
ful but vital to the claimant's competitive viability'").
170. See discussion supra Part III.E.
171. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
172. Id.
173. Am. Online, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 862-63.
174. Id. at 862.
1753
21
Doda: Antitrust Concerns in the B2B Marketplace: Are They "Bricks and M
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW AEVIEW
defendants could not reasonably duplicate AOL's facility.'75
When considering whether a claimant's denial to a B2B mar-
ketplace violates the essential facilities doctrine, one vital element is
to determine if there is a competitive relationship between the
market maker and the claimant. When the bias of the market
maker is neutral or operated by an independent third party, the
competitive relationship element will most likely be lacking. On
the other hand, if the market maker is biased, the market maker
could possibly have competitive reasons for denying the claimant
access to the essential facility.
V. JOINT VENTURES
A. Collaboration Guidelines
Typically, a collaborative venture to form a B2B marketplace is
negotiated to achieve cost savings or other procompetitive bene-
fits. Recognizing the potential cost savings, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") have
issued the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competi-
178tors (Collaboration Guidelines).
The preamble of the Collaboration Guidelines acknowledges
that competitors occasionally need to collaborate "[i]n order to
compete in modem markets."'79 'Such collaborations often are not
only benign but procompetitive.' ', 80 The purpose of the Collabora-
tion Guidelines is to explain how certain antitrust issues raised by
collaboration between competitors will be analyzed.'
8'
175. Id. at 862-63.
176. Recall a market maker is someone who creates an Internet market that
matches buyers and sellers. Glossary, supra note 31.
177. Marc D. Machlin, Sleeping with the Enemy? Antitrust Advice For Online Col-
laborators, 16 FORT. 38, 38 (Sept. 2000).
178. Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,160 (Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines].
179. Id. 1 13,161, preamble (stating "[c]ompetitive forces are driving firms to-
ward complex collaborations to achieve goals such as expanding into foreign mar-
kets, funding expensive innovation efforts, and lowering production and other
Costs").
180. Id.
181. Id. (explaining that no set of guidelines can provide specific answers to
every antitrust question arising from competitor collaborations). Thus, the Col-
laboration Guidelines provide an analytical framework in which competitor col-
laborations may be formed procompetively. Id.
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B. Overview Of The Collaboration Guidelines
Section 1 of the Collaboration Guidelines provides a basic out-
line of the analysis the DOJ and FTC will use in addressing the le-
gality of competitor collaborations. 
18 2
Section 2 provides general principals for evaluating competitor
collaborations. 83 This section lists four principles: identifying po-
tential procompetitive benefits,184 identifying potential anticompeti-
tive harms, analysis of the overall collaboration, and assessing
the competitive effects at the time of the harm to competition.""
Section 3 provides the analytical framework for evaluating
competitor collaboration agreements. ss  For example,
"[a]greements that always or almost always tend to raise price or
reduce output are per se illegal."'89 However, if the participant's
agreement is related to an efficiency enhancing activity and is rea-
sonably tied to procompetitive benefits, then a rule of reason analy-
sis will be used. 90  In determining whether the procompetitive
benefits offset the anticompetitive harm, the inquiry is whether the
agreement limits the ability of participants to make decisions on
such things as price and output, or whether the agreement facili-
tates an opportunity for competitors to collude on anticompetitive
182. Id. 1 13,161, § 1 (defining a competitor collaboration as an agreement
"between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the economic
activity resulting therefrom").
183. Id. 13,161, § 2.
184. Id. (recognizing some possible procompetitive benefits from competitor
collaboration, including the ability to offer goods and services that are cheaper
and more valuable to consumers, the ability to bring the goods to market faster,
and the ability to reduce the time to develop and ultimately sell new products).
185. Id. (stating that "[c]ompetitor collaborations may harm competition and
consumers by increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or
reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in
the absence of the relevant agreement").
186. Id. (explaining that any agreement or set of agreements between com-
petitors will be analyzed to determine whether it harms competition).
187. Id. (realizing that the relevant agreement may change over time, due to
change in circumstances, internal reorganization, adoption of new agreements,
change in market conditions, or change in market share, competitive effects will
be assessed at the time of the possible harm to competition).
188. Id. 13,161, § 3.
189. Id. 13,161, § 3.2 (identifying agreements by competitors to fix prices or
output, rig bids, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, ter-
ritories or lines of commerce as illegal per se).
190. Id. 13,161, § 3.3 (stating that the rule of reason is a flexible inquiry and
focuses on the nature of the agreement and market conditions). The inquiry is to
determine the business purpose of the agreement and whether it has already
caused anticompetitive harm. Id.
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terms.' 9'
Some key issues concerning B2B marketplace collaboration
agreements include purchasing and buying collaborations, exclu-
sion, and information sharing.
1. Purchasing Or Buying Collaborations
Joint purchasing can help to reduce transaction costs and be
procompetitive by enabling "participants to centralize ordering, to
combine warehousing or distribution functions more efficiently, or
to achieve other efficiencies."' 9'
On the other hand, there are risks associated with the efficien-
cies. For example, there is the possibility purchasing agreements
can create or increase market power, or produce an incentive to
drive the price of the product downward, ultimately limiting the
output below what would prevail in the absence of the agree-
193
ment.
The essential element to consider is whether the collaboration
can obtain market power. Thus, when the collaboration combines
to purchase an item bought in large quantities worldwide, such as
pencils, it is unlikely the collaboration will obtain market power.194
However, market power is likely to occur when the collaboration is
buying a specialized item, such as automobile axles. 19'
2. Exclusivity
Exclusivity involves rules prohibiting B2B marketplace partici-
196pants from joining other B2B marketplaces. A collaboration of
competing firms should be allowed to compete against each other
and against new B2B marketplaces.1 97
The Collaboration Guidelines suggest competitive concerns
191. Id. 13,161, § 3.31 (a-b).
192. Id. 113,161, § 3.31(a).
193. Id.
194. DeSanti, supra note 30.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Machlin, supra note 177, at 43 (recommending that "participants should
avoid financial arrangements that eliminate their incentives or ability to com-
pete"). Machlin suggests the B2B marketplace should be managed independently
of the participants, allowing sensitive decisions to be made without consulting the
individual participants. Id. at 43-44. Under this reasoning, a participant in a bi-
ased B2B marketplace, in order to compete independently, should retain other
assets necessary to compete. Id.
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are lessened, provided that B2B marketplace participants "actually
have continued to compete, either through separate, independent
business operations or through membership in other collabora-
tions, or are permitted to do so. 19 8 Susan DeSanti outlined three
inquiries when analyzing anticompetive effects from exclusion from
the B2B marketplace: (1) whether the excluded company can ob-
tain an adequate substitute at a comparable cost; (2) whether the
exclusion had competitive consequences in the relevant market;
and (3) whether the exclusion harmed competition as opposed to a
single competitor.199
3. Sharing Of Information
Certain collaboration agreements between competitors may
present an opportunity for the participants to collude anticompeti-
tively"'
The Collaboration Guidelines suggest that "other things being
equal, the sharing of information relating to price, output, costs, or
strategic planning is more likely to raise competitive concerns." As
discussed previously, the B2B marketplace is in a position to pub-
lish pricing information on a real time basis, suggesting collusion.
An example of information sharing using modern information
technology occurred in United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.201
In this case, the defendant airlines used a computerized fare dis-
semination service to announce price changes in the future for the
purpose of reaching an agreement on price.'°2 The airlines even-
tually signed a consent agreement prohibiting specific price-fixing203
agreements. This case indicates computerized information net-
works are capable of disseminating collusive price signaling and
price-fixing information.20
4
On the other hand, not all exchange or disclosure of informa-
tion between competitors involves collusion. The Collaboration
Guidelines "recognize that the sharing of information among com-
198. Collaboration Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 13,161, § 3.34(a).
199. DeSanti, supra note 30.
200. Collaboration Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 13,161, § 3.31(b).
201. 58 Fed. Reg. 3971 (1993).
202. Id. at 3976 (explaining the defendant airlines "exchanged clear and con-
cise messages setting forth the fare changes that each preferred, and [then] en-
gaged in an electronic dialogue to work out their differences").
203. Id. at 3978.
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petitors may be procompetitive and is often reasonably necessary to
achieve the procompetitive benefits of certain collaborations."
20'
4. Safety Zone
Lastly, section 4 of the Collaboration Guidelines identifies two
"safety zones" for collaborative ventures. 6 Since not all competitor
collaborations are anticompetitive, the DOJ and FTC adopted a
11 207"safety zone" to encourage procompetitive behavior.
Section 4.2 is the most relevant when considering the collabo-
ration of competitors in a B2B marketplace. The Collaboration
Guidelines provide that "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the
Agencies do not challenge a competitor collaboration when the
market shares of the collaboration and its participants collectively
account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market
in which competition may be affected. 208 However, this safety zone
is not available if a collaboration agreement is per se illegal. Re-
liance on this safety zone when forming a B2B marketplace may be
risky. For example, participants to a collaboration agreement for a
B2B marketplace may experience an increase in market share over• •210
time that exceeds the twenty percent level. However, simply be-
cause a competitor collaboration falls outside the twenty percent
safety zone does not automatically indicate anticompetitive behav-
211
ior.
Because a B2B marketplace offers significant transactional cost
savings, increased efficiency does not make it immune from anti-
trust concerns. Specifically, the DOJ and FTC indicate concern re-
garding increased market power of collaborating competitors, ex-
clusive dealings, and collusive information sharing. The
Collaboration Guidelines provide some guidance as well as a "safety
zone" to navigate clear of these areas.
205. Collaboration Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 13,161, § 3.31(b) (stating
the "sharing [of] certain technology, know-how, or other intellectual property may
be essential to achieve the procompetitive benefits of an R&D collaboration").
206. Id. 13,161, § 4.
207. Id. 13,161, § 4.1.
208. Id. 13,161, § 4.2.
209. Id.
210. Machlin, supra note 177, at 42.
211. Collaboration Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 113,161, § 4.1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As more and more businesses discover the savings and effi-
ciencies available through a B2B marketplace, scores more will
want to become part of the "technological renaissance." Although
B2B marketplaces are reinventing the way to do business online,
they cannot evade antitrust scrutiny. The purpose of this article is
not to suggest the application of some hard-fast rules to the pro-
gressively evolving B2B marketplace technology, but to identify key
antitrust issues pertaining to the B2B marketplace.
The application of the "bricks and mortar" antitrust laws to the
"virtual" B2B marketplace requires a specific definition of a rele-
vant market and specifically the geographic market. Defining the
geographic market of the Internet as "infinite" may not be specific
enough. In addition, determining whether the B2B marketplace
operates by an independent third party or a partnership of buyers
and/or sellers will be important and, if it is a partnership, whether
the partnership consists of competitors needs to be determined. A
final issue is whether public information exchanged on the Inter-
net on a real time basis constitutes an illegal exchange of informa-
tion. These questions require answers.
Recognizing these issues, the DOJ and FTC have published the
Collaboration Guidelines to provide guidance in the formation of
B2B marketplaces. The Guidelines specifically address the forma-
tion of buying collaborations, exclusivity, and the exchange of in-
formation. However, they are only guidelines. Whether they can
keep pace with the B2B marketplace technology remains to be
seen.
The ultimate question is whether certainty achieved through
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